The Evolution of Aesthetics
From an evolutionary point of view, aesthetics can be regarded as one of the functional-as opposed to anatomical-apomorphies that characterise our species. However, this does not mean that the capacity of aesthetics is unique to Homo sapiens. There is no a priori reason to consider that perhaps other members of the Hominin tribe didn't possess this trait. It is still an open question how such a capacity evolved. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to understand the evolutionary process that gave rise to aesthetics, both in terms of the reconstruction of the milestones in said process, and in terms of the selective pressures that may have provided functional value to such a capacity. As regards the reconstruction of the process, we need to rely on the archaeological and fossil evidence, but they are both incomplete and partial, given that at most they provide evidence of the results, not of the psychological capacities. Thus, marks in lithic tools or different materials may reveal the effect of anthropic actions with no apparent utility, or uncertain symbolic meaning; while the anatomical correlates of a particular functional trait are to be determined before they can be found in the fossil record.
In the case of aesthetics, this becomes especially problematic, as there is no particular anatomical trait to be considered, beyond specific aspects of brain organization. To make things more complicated, aesthetic appreciation seems not to be a single psychological function, but the outcome of a mosaic evolutionary process (Nadal et al. 2009 ) that involved the assemblage of different, emotional and cognitive, components. Research about such different components is gaining momentum, giving us some insight about (1) which brain areas are involved in the capacity of aesthetics (Cela-Conde et al. 2004; CelaConde et al. 2009; Kawabata and Zeki 2004; Vartanian and Goel 2004; Munar et al. 2012a) ; and (2) how do these areas work together in different aesthetic tasks (Munar et al. 2012b; Cela-Conde et al. 2013) . From this standpoint, it makes sense to start small: looking for the roots of aesthetics in the most simple and basic processes which already exhibits the marks of aesthetic appreciation. Basic perceptual preferences constitute, in our view, such a minimal stage of aesthetics.
Preferences also seem the right place to look when considering the functional dimension of the evolutionary process that gave rise to aesthetics, as they relate to the ecological background and primal behaviours underlying it. It is possible to investigate whether they are universal, and whether they are exclusively human, or also present in our closest relatives. While this might result in just so stories depicting dubious adaptive scenarios, an empirically sound evolutionary approach would be invaluable when attempting to make sense of our aesthetic capacity.
In this chapter, after reviewing some of the most well known preferences, we will focus our attention on the case of the visual preference for curvature. This preference has been hypothesised to result from a primitive perception of sharp transitions in contour as conveying a sense of threat. We introduce a new approach-avoidance paradigm, inspired by the embodied mind framework, as a better suited method to study such preferences while presenting some of the most important results obtained in our comparative and cross-cultural studies so far.
Basic Perceptual Preferences
A general feature of our perceptive systems is that they are not neutral, but preferentially oriented. That is, some stimuli are preferred over others, and this can be seen as a basic form of aesthetic preference. This preference seems to be sustained at the neuronal level by the reward system, among others, which makes some stimuli more appealing, or positively arousing; while driving us to avoid or dislike others-even if the liking judgment may result from a longer, more cognitive, process (Cela-Conde et al. 2013 ). Although it is perfectly possible that some of these preferences are the outcome of an individual process of reinforcement learning, such possibility is still dependent on the existence of intrinsic preferences and unconditioned stimuli, which can be expected to be universal and innate. Therefore, we propose a research programme that identifies these basic preferences, testing whether they are, in effect, innate-and not the result of an idiosyncratic reinforcement story, or culture-specific preference depending on its cognitive acquisition. This programme also addresses the question of the evolution of such preferences: how did our species come to acquire such preferences? Was there any kind of evolutionary advantage in having them?
